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The Wells Fargo Scandal and Efforts to Reform 
Incentive-Based Compensation in Financial Institutions 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Without proper safeguards, incentive-based compensation 
arrangements in financial institutions may encourage excessive risk- 
taking by employees, leading to serious financial loss for financial 
institutions.1 The incentive to take excessive risk was a contributing 
factor to the financial crisis that began in 2007, with some saying that 
employee incentives were “most at fault in contributing to the financial 
crisis.”2 For example, in incentive-based compensation arrangements, a 
high-risk loan has the potential to generate more revenue for the 
financial institution, and consequently more compensation for the 
employee who approved the loan, than a low-risk loan due to higher 
interest generated by high-risk loans.3  These  compensation 
arrangements were based on short-term revenue, and thereby 
incentivized employees to expose the financial institution to more risk.4 
The financial institution would often not realize this risk until the loan 
was consummated and the employee had received compensation.5 To 
combat this risk, financial institutions, with oversight from federal 
regulators, have implemented compensation policies that tie pay to 
performance, with risk evaluated at different points in time.6 
 
1. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395, 36396 
(June 25, 2010). 
2. David F. Larker, et al., Follow the Money: Compensation, Risk, and the Financial 
Crisis, STAN. CLOSER LOOK SERIES (Sept. 8, 2014), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/ 
files/publication-pdf/cgri-closer-look-43-risk-compensation-financial-crisis.pdf. See also 
Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation, 75 Fed. Reg. at 36396; BD. OF GOVERNORS OF 
THE  FED.  RESERVE  SYS.,  INCENTIVE  COMPENSATION  PRACTICES:  A  REPORT   ON   THE 
HORIZONTAL REVIEW OF PRACTICES AT LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS (2011) [hereinafter 
HORIZONTAL     REVIEW], https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-reports/files/ 
incentive-compensation-practices-report-201110.pdf. 
3. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 5. 
4. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 5. 
5. See HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 5 (“Some of these risks may be realized 
in the short term, while other may become apparent only over the long term.”). 
6. E.g., HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 5.  See also Financial Services Firms 
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In 2009, federal agencies and financial institutions began to 
develop policies and procedures to mitigate the incentive for excessive 
risks arising from incentive-based compensation policies.7 The process 
began when certain financial regulators—Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (“OCC”), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (“FRB”), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), and 
Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”)—issued final guidance 
(“Interagency Guidance”) on incentive-based compensation 
arrangements, and financial institutions responded by implementing risk 
conscious provisions into their incentive-based compensation policies.8 
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve initiated a horizontal review 
(“Horizontal Review”) of incentive-compensation arrangements to 
ensure that the compensation arrangements in financial institutions were 
consistent with safe and sound banking policies outlined in the 
Interagency Guidance.9 Congress  specifically  addressed  incentive- 
based compensation in Section 956 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act” or “Dodd- 
Frank”)10 which requires six federal agencies—FRB; OCC; FDIC; the 
National Credit Union Administration Board (“NCUA”); the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”); and the Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (“FHFA”) (collectively the “Federal Regulators”)11—to 
prescribe rules or issue guidelines that prohibit certain compensation 
arrangements and require disclosure of compensation arrangements in 
certain financial institutions.12 Pursuant to Section 956, Federal 
Regulators initially proposed a rule in 2011 (“2011 Proposed Rule”) to 
 
Increase Focus on Building Sound Risk Culture to Prevent Inappropriate Risk Taking, 
MERCER (July 18, 2016), http://www.mercer.us/newsroom/financial-services-firms-increase- 
focus-on-building-sound-risk-culture-to-prevent-inappropriate-risk-taking.html (noting that 
over 90% of financial firms have some type of policy which allows compensation to be 
adjusted or forfeited). 
7. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 1. 
8. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395, 36396 
(June 25, 2010); HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 1. 
9. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 1–2. 
10. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
956, 12 U.S.C. § 5641 (2015). 
11. Dodd-Frank § 956, 12 U.S.C. § 5641(e)(1) (“The term ‘appropriate Federal 
regulator’ means (1) the FRB, (2) the OCC, (3) the FDIC, (4) the OTS, (5) the NCUA, (6) 
the SEC, and (7) the FHFA (Only six of these institutions remain after OTS authority was 
transferred to the FDIC, OCC, and FRB pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 5412). 
12.   Dodd-Frank § 956(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5641(a)(1). 
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prohibit certain incentive-based compensation  arrangements.13  The 
2011 Proposed Rule was not finalized, and on June 10, 2016, over five 
years after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, Federal Regulators re- 
proposed uniform rules (the “2016 Proposed Rule” or the “Proposed 
Rule”) for incentive-based compensation arrangements in financial 
institutions.14 
Despite regulatory efforts and policy changes by financial 
institutions, the incentive for excessive and inappropriate risks  
continues to be a problem in financial institutions.15 When regulators 
proposed uniform rules on compensation policies, financial institutions 
fought back against additional regulation, arguing that current policies 
promote a proper balance between risk and reward.16 In the wake of the 
Wells Fargo scandal in the fall of 2016, however, politicians have 
pressured regulators to reign in excessive compensation and impose 
tougher regulations.17 With increased political pressure, regulators are 
less likely to accept arguments against compensation rules for financial 
institutions.18 Moreover, with the recent election of President Donald J. 
Trump, who has stated that he plans to roll back Dodd-Frank and the 
accompanying regulations, the fate of the Proposed Rule remains 
uncertain.19   Regardless of whether the Proposed Rule is adopted, in 
 
13. Proposed Rule on Incentive-based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 
21170, 21170 (proposed Apr. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 563h (OTS); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 
(NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. § 248 (SEC)). 
14. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 
37670, 37670 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 
(FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, 303 (SEC)). 
15. See, e.g., Letter from Sen. Menendez, et al. to Janet Yellen, Chair, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., et al. (Oct. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Menendez Letter], 
https://www.menendez.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Incentive-Based-Pay-Letter-Wells-Fargo- 
Sec-956-2016-10-26.pdf (asking Federal Regulators to strengthen and finalize proposed 
rules on incentive-based compensation arrangements and noting that the improper sales 
practices at Wells Fargo provide an example of continued problems in incentive-based 
compensation). 
16. Jesse Hamilton, Wells Fargo Scandal Hurts Wall Street’s Fight Against Pay Rules, 
107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 353, 364–65 (Sept. 19, 2016). 
17. Menendez Letter, supra note 15. 
18. Hamilton, Wells Fargo Scandal Hurts Wall Street’s Fight Against Pay Rules, supra 
note 16. 
19. See Zeke Faux & Jenny Surane, Wall Street Hope Revived as Trump Signs Plan to 
Roll Back Rules, 108 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 201 (Feb. 6, 2017) (noting that the new 
administration will attempt to roll back many rules implemented as part of Dodd-Frank). 
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continuing to address excessive risks created by incentive-based 
compensation Federal Regulators must work with financial institutions 
to determine whether policies encourage excessive risks.20 In addition, 
financial institutions are advised to adjust their compensation policies to 
appropriately reduce risk.21 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II summarizes the 
regulatory measures and policy changes related to incentive-based 
compensation since the financial crisis.22 Part III explains the Wells 
Fargo scandal as it relates to incentive-based compensation.23 Part IV 
describes unintended consequences of over-regulation of 
compensation.24 Part V concludes by explaining the  possibility  of 
future regulation of incentive-based compensation.25 
 
II. REGULATORY MEASURES AND POLICY CHANGES IN INCENTIVE-BASED 
COMPENSATION SINCE THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
In response to the financial crisis and pressure from regulators, 
financial institutions have developed policies to decrease the incentive 
for employees to expose the financial institution to excessive risk.26 
Federal Regulators have reviewed compensation policies of financial 
institutions and now require financial institutions to incorporate risk 
analysis when developing compensation policies.27 As of July 18, 2016, 
over 90% of banks had a policy of deferring compensation and 
monitoring employee performance over an extended period of time.28 
 
 
20. See Jeff Bater, OCC Flags Sales Practices at Banks in Semiannual Risk Report,  
108 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 65 (Jan. 9, 2017) (noting that the OCC has flagged 
governance of sales practices as a key risk facing the financial industry). 
21. See Larker et al., supra note 2 (explaining that “one approach to reducing risk in 
the bank industry is for regulators to monitor the riskiness of bank assets and restrict the 
amount of leverage” and “another approach is for boards to restructure compensation 
contracts to reduce incentive to take risk in the first place”). 
22. See infra Part II. 
23. See infra Part III. 
24. See infra Part IV. 
25. See infra Part V. 
26. See HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 13 (explaining risk adjustments of 
compensation and performance measures implemented after the financial crisis). 
27. See Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395, 
36399 (June 25, 2010) (“[F]acts and circumstances will determine which employees have 
the ability to expose the organization to material amounts of risk.”). 
28. MERCER, supra note 6. 
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These compensation arrangements vary based on the size, complexity, 
risk profile, and business strategy of each financial institution.29 
When a financial institution implements a new compensation 
policy, it must employ a complex balancing scheme to (1) “attract and 
reward talented employees”; (2) “promote appropriate behavior”; and 
(3)   “[incentivize]   highly   productive   work.”30     In   addition, many 
financial institutions include a risk management component when 
“selecting performance measures, goal setting, and performance 
evaluation, which is a significant development for aligning performance 
with sound risk-taking.”31 The overarching goal of a  financial 
institution’s compensation policy should be to maximize shareholder 
return while promoting a proper balance between risk-taking and risk 
management.32 When issuing guidance or proposing rules on 
compensation policies in financial institutions, Federal Regulators 
should consider a highly individualized approach that incorporates this 
complex balancing process.33 Since 2010, financial institutions have 
worked with Federal Regulators to develop more risk-conscious 
incentive-based compensation policies using a principles and risk-based 
approach based on the specific characteristics of the financial 
institution.34 
Financial institutions and regulators are under pressure to  
reform compensation policies and reduce the incentive to take excessive 
risk.35    Due  to  the  nature  of  the  financial  industry,  however,  it   is 
 
29. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. at 36406 n.6; 
Comment Letter from McGuireWoods, LLP, to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y, Bd. of 
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., et. al. (July 22, 2016) [hereinafter McGuireWoods 
Comment on Proposed Rule], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-16/s70716-56.pdf. 
30. Comment Letter from American Bankers Ass’s. et al., to Robert deV. Frierson, 
Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., et al. (July 22, 2016) [hereinafter ABA 
Comment on Proposed Rule], https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-07-16/s70716-30.pdf. 
31. MERCER, supra note 6. 
32. ABA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 30, at 2. 
33. ABA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 30, at 2. 
34. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395, at 
36396–97; Comment Letter from Hope A. Hardison, Senior Exec. Vice President, Wells 
Fargo & Co., to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. (July 
22, 2016) [hereinafter Wells Fargo Comment on Proposed Rule], https://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/s7-07-16/s70716-48.pdf. 
35. Joe Mont, Wells Fargo Scandal Prompts Senators to Focus on Clawbacks, KPMG, 
COMPLIANCE WK. (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.complianceweek.com/blogs/the-filing- 
cabinet/wells-fargo-scandal-prompts-senators-to-focus-on-clawbacks- 
kpmg#.WBfXfHeZPBI. 
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impossible to completely eliminate risk.36 Therefore, financial 
institutions must decide what level of risk is appropriate and develop 
compensation policies that encourage employees to pursue objectives in 
a manner consistent with the chosen level of risk.37 Meanwhile, Federal 
Regulators are tasked with preventing banks from engaging in activities 
which encourage excessive risk.38 
 
A. Regulatory Efforts to Reduce the Risk of Incentive-based 
Compensation 
 
In the wake of the financial crisis, four federal agencies—the 
FRB, OCC, FDIC, and OTS39—issued Interagency Guidance which 
requires financial institutions to develop compensation policies 
consistent with safe and sound banking practices.40 The Interagency 
Guidance requires financial institutions with incentive-based 
compensation arrangements to ensure that compensation arrangements 
provide employees with benefits “that appropriately balance risk and 
reward,” are “compatible with effective controls and risk management,” 
and are supported by sound governance, “including active and effective 
oversight by the organization’s board of directors.”41 Specifically, 
financial institutions must address the risk-taking behavior of individual 
employees and groups of employees whose actions, when taken 
together, could affect the risk profile of the institution.42 
In addition to issuing Interagency Guidance, in late 2009  
Federal Regulators initiated a Horizontal Review of incentive-based 
compensation practices at twenty-five large, complex financial 
institutions.43    The  purpose  of  the  Horizontal  Review  was:  (1)  to 
 
36. Larker et al., supra note 2, at 1. 
37. Larker et al., supra note 2, at 1. 
38. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
956, 12 U.S.C. § 5641(b) (2015). 
39. The OTS ceased to exist on October 19, 2011. See Dodd-Frank § 312, 12 U.S.C. § 
5412 (transferring powers and duties of OTS to FRB, FDIC, and OCC). 
40. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395, 36396 
(June 25, 2010). 
41. Id. 
42.    Id. at 36413. 
43. The financial institutions in the Horizontal Review were “Ally Financial Inc.; 
American Express Company; Bank of America Corporation; The Bank of New York Mellon 
Corporation;   Capital   One   Financial   Corporation;   Citigroup   Inc.;   Discover Financial 
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examine the range of compensation practices across firms and (2)  
“guide each financial institution in implementing the Interagency 
Guidance.”44 The Horizontal Review found that  every  financial 
institution included in the review had implemented policies to balance 
risk and financial results.45 Although compensation practices improved, 
the FRB report on the Horizontal Review noted that all of the firms 
could do more to address the issue.46 After completing the Horizontal 
Review, regulators continued to address problems in incentive-based 
compensation policies through the normal examination process.47 
The Dodd-Frank Act specifically addresses the  excessive 
amount of risk associated with incentive-based compensation 
arrangements.48 Section 956 of Dodd-Frank requires six Federal 
Regulators to jointly regulate incentive-based compensation 
arrangements in covered financial institutions.49 Under Section 956, a 
covered financial institution includes: a bank; bank holding company; 
broker-dealer; credit union; investment advisor; Federal National 
Mortgage Association; the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation; 
and any other financial institution that Federal Regulators determine 
should be treated as a covered financial institution (collectively 
“Covered Institutions”).50 Section 956 provides an exception, however, 
for financial institutions with assets of less than $1 billion, which will 
not be subject to any rules proposed pursuant to Section 956.51  In 
contrast, a Covered Institution with assets of $1 billion or greater must 
disclose the structure of all incentive-based compensation arrangements 
 
 
Services; The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.; JPMorgan Chase & Co.; Morgan Stanley; 
Northern Trust Corporation; The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.; State Street 
Corporation; SunTrust Banks, Inc.; U.S. Bancorp; and Wells Fargo & Company; and the 
U.S. operations of Barclays plc, BNP Paribas, Credit Suisse Group AG, Deutsche Bank AG, 
HSBC Holdings plc, Royal Bank of Canada, The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc, 
Societe Generale, and UBS AG.”  HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 1 n.1. 
44. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 1. 
45. These policies include deferring compensation and evaluating performance over a 
longer period. For more information see infra Part II.B. 
46. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 1. 
47. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 1. 
48. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
956, 12 U.S.C. § 5641 (2015). 
49.   Dodd-Frank § 956(e)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5641(a)(1). 
50.   Dodd-Frank § 956(e)(2)(A)–(G), 12 U.S.C. § 5641(e)(2)(A)–(G). 
51.   Dodd-Frank § 956(f), 12 U.S.C. § 5641(f). 
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to its appropriate Federal Regulator.52 Upon disclosure, the Federal 
Regulator must determine whether the compensation structure provides 
excessive compensation or could lead to material financial loss.53 In 
addition, Federal Regulators must prohibit incentive-based 
compensation that encourages inappropriate risk by providing excessive 
compensation or compensation arrangements that could lead to material 
financial loss.54 Under Section 956, Federal Regulators have the option 
of either issuing guidance or proposing regulations on incentive-based 
compensation arrangements.55 
In 2011, Federal Regulators issued a proposed rule on incentive- 
based compensation policies in Covered Institutions.56 The 2011 
Proposed Rule would have required executives at larger Covered 
Institutions—those with at least $50 billion in assets—to defer at least 
50% of compensation for three years.57 The 2011 Proposed Rule would 
also have required the board of directors or a board committee of a 
larger Covered Institution to approve all compensation arrangements for 
certain covered employees who had “the ability to expose the entity to 
possible losses that are substantial in relation to the entity’s size, capital 
or overall risk tolerance.”58 Finally, the  2011  Proposed  Rule  would 
have required all Covered Institutions to provide an annual report to the 
appropriate Federal Regulator to determine compliance with the 
regulations.59 
The 2011 Proposed Rule was never finalized, but Federal 
Regulators re-proposed rules pursuant to Section 956 on June 10,  
2016.60   The Proposed Rule regulates incentive-based compensation61 
 
52.   Dodd-Frank § 956(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5641(a), (f). 
53.   Dodd-Frank § 956(a)(1)(A)–(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5641(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2015). 
54.   Dodd-Frank § 956(b)(1)–(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5641(b)(1)–(2). 
55. Dodd-Frank § 956(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5641(a)(1); Proposed Rule on Incentive- 
Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37670, 37670 (proposed June 10, 2016) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 
12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, 303 
(SEC)). 
56. Proposed Rule on Incentive-based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 
21170, 21170 (proposed Apr. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. §563h (OTS); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 
(NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 248 (SEC)). 
57.    Id. at 21216. 
58.    Id. at 21218. 
59.    Id. at 21215. 
60. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
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using three tiers of regulation based on total consolidated assets.62 Like 
the 2011 Proposed Rule, the basic disclosure requirements and 
prescriptions apply to all Covered  Institutions.63  The  Proposed  Rule 
also imposes uniform rules for determining covered employees, senior 
executive officers (“SEOs”), and significant risk takers (“SRTs”) of 
each Covered Institution.64 In addition to  disclosure  requirements, 
Level 2 Covered Institutions—those with between $50 and $250 billion 
in assets—must restrict the timing and amount of incentive-based 
compensation for covered employees determined to be SEOs and 
SRTs.65 Further restrictions apply to SEOs and SRTs at Level  1  
Covered Institutions—those with $250 billion or more in assets.66 
The restrictions on timing and amount of compensation apply to 
covered employees at Level 1 and Level 2 Covered Institutions who 
qualify as an SEO or SRT.67 An SEO is defined as an employee who, 
regardless of title, salary, or compensation, performs the functions of a 
senior officer or head of a major business line or control function of a 
Covered Institution.68 A more complex test is used to determine the 
SRTs of a Covered Institution.69 The SRT definition depends on 
whether  the  employee  meets  the  relative  compensation  test  or  the 
 
 
37670. 
61. Id. at 37832 (“Incentive-based compensation means any variable compensation, 
fees, or benefits that serve as an incentive or reward for performance.”). 
62.    Id. at 37833. 
63. Id. at 37834; Proposed Rule on Incentive-based Compensation Arrangements, 76 
Fed. Reg. at 21215. 
64. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
37833. 
65. Id. at 37835 (stating that applicable Level 1 incentive-based compensation must be 
deferred for four years, whereas applicable Level 2 compensation need only be deferred for 
three years) (requiring 50% of qualifying incentive-based compensation to be deferred for 
Level 1 significant risk-takers and Level 2 senior executives) (stating that 40% of qualifying 
incentive-based compensation be deferred for Level 2 significant risk-takers). 
66. Id. 
67.    Id. at 37833. 
68. Id. at 37833 (“Senior Executive Officer means any covered employee who holds 
the title or, without regard to title, salary, or compensation, performs the function of one or 
more of the following positions at a covered institution for any period of time in the relevant 
performance period: president, chief executive officer, executive chairman, chief operating 
officer, chief financial officer, chief investment officer, chief legal officer, chief lending 
officer, chief risk officer, chief compliance officer, chief audit executive, chief  credit  
officer, chief accounting officer, or head of a major business line or control function.”). 
69. Id. 
  
 
 
438 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE          [Vol. 21 
exposure test.70 Notwithstanding the employee’s actual authority or risk 
exposure, a covered employee will be deemed an SRT if the employee: 
(1) receives compensation of which at least one-third is incentive-based 
compensation; and, (2) either (i) receives the highest 5% of 
compensation compared to all other covered persons at a Level 1 
institution—or 2% at a Level 2 institution; or (ii) may commit or expose 
at least 0.5% or more of the common equity tier 1 capital.71 If an 
employee is deemed to be an SEO or SRT, the Covered Institution must 
defer a portion of his or her incentive-based compensation and subject 
the incentive-based compensation to downward adjustment, forfeiture, 
and clawback provisions, which are explained in more detail below.72 
 
B. Mandatory Deferrals, Downward Adjustments, and Clawbacks 
 
Most compensation policies that balance risk and financial 
results include a combination of risk adjustment of awards and deferral 
of payments.73 For instance, a portion of incentive-based compensation 
may be deferred for a specified period of time, and the compensation 
will be subject to downward adjustment and clawback provisions during 
the deferral period.74 A financial institution can use these provisions to 
adjust or recoup an employee’s compensation if the employee exposes 
the institution to excessive risk or material financial loss.75 Specifically, 
downward adjustment provisions allow an employer to decrease 
compensation   that   has   not   yet   been   paid   to   an   employee.76 
 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 37833–34, 37692 n. 83 (“In the proposed rule, the Agencies have tailored the 
measure of capital to the type of covered institution. For most covered institutions, the 
exposure test will be based on common equity tier 1 capital.”); Capital Adequacy of FDIC- 
Supervised Institutions, 12 C.F.R. § 324.22(b) (2016) (defining common equity tier as the 
sum of the following: common stock, subject to certain limitations; retained earnings; 
accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI); and any common equity tier 1 minority 
interest subject to limitation under § 324.21(c); minus regulatory adjustments and  
deductions in 12 C.F.R. § 324.22). 
72. See infra Section II.B. 
73. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 2. 
74. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 15–17. 
75. See, e.g., Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 37670, 37836–37 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC);  
12 C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, 303 (SEC)). 
76. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
37832. 
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Alternatively, clawback provisions allow an employer to recoup 
compensation that has already been paid and is fully vested to the 
employee.77 
While clawback and downward adjustment provisions are 
common, Covered Institutions vary in the specific actions that trigger 
enforcement of the provisions.78 One common weakness in downward 
adjustment and clawback provisions is that the activity that triggers 
enforcement is not broad enough to cover the many potential situations 
that can arise.79 For example, a provision that provides for recoupment 
of compensation upon a showing of fraud may not be triggered when an 
employee exposes a financial institution to excessive risk in violation of 
the financial institution’s risk management policy.80 Another common 
issue involves the disparity in the level of discretion financial  
institutions exercise when enforcing the provisions.81 In some cases, the 
effectiveness of the provision depends on how eager the board is to 
recoup the compensation, especially in the case of clawback provisions, 
where the compensation has already  vested.82  For  this  reason, 
downward adjustments are used frequently, while clawbacks of 
compensation are relatively rare.83 According to a recent survey of 
financial institutions, over a two-year period approximately 50% of 
financial institutions adjusted deferred compensation pursuant to a 
downward adjustment provision.84 During that same period, only about 
10% of financial institutions enforced clawback provisions.85 
Several successful actions to recoup compensation from 
employees   highlight   the   potential   effectiveness   of   clawback and 
 
 
 
77. Id. 
78. Michael Greene, Will Wells Fargo Scandal Lead to Changes in Corporate Pay 
Plans?, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 13, 469, 475–76 (Oct. 5, 2016). 
79. Id. 
80. See id. 
81. Caleb Melby & Yalman Onaran, Clawing Back Bankers’ Pay at Wells Fargo is 
Harder Than It Looks, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 11, 393, 405–06 (Sept. 21, 2016) 
(noting that 76% of the largest banks have clawback policies but the policies are rarely 
enforced); Greene, supra note 78, at 475 (noting that about half of compensation policies are 
subject to compensation committee discretion). 
82. Melby & Onaran, supra note 81, at 405; Greene, supra note 78, at 475. 
83. Melby & Onaran, supra note 81, at 405. 
84. Melby & Onaran, supra note 81, at 405; MERCER, supra note 6. 
85. Melby & Onaran, supra note 81, at 405. 
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downward adjustment provisions.86 In one of the most successful 
enforcement actions, the SEC recouped over $600 million from the 
CEO of  UnitedHealth  Group.87  Similarly,  JPMorgan  sought 
recoupment from four traders who lost $6.2 billion in the  London 
Whale scandal.88 Three of the four traders voluntarily forfeited their 
compensation, and JPMorgan ultimately settled with the fourth 
employee to recoup a total of $100 million in compensation from the 
group.89 More recently, when Wells Fargo was accused of opening over 
two million fake customer accounts, the CEO and manager of 
community banking voluntarily forfeited a total of $60 million in 
unvested compensation.90 However, reputational harm rarely leads to 
recoupment of vested compensation, and therefore Wells Fargo is 
unlikely to recoup additional funds.91 
Downward adjustment and clawback provisions generally 
include enforcement triggers such as financial restatements, fraud, or 
misconduct.92 While previous financial statutes focused recoupment 
provisions primarily on material financial restatements, Section 956 of 
Dodd-Frank   imposes   no   such   limitation.93      Under   Section  956, 
 
86. Greene, supra note 78, at 475. 
87. The former CEO of United Health Group forfeited nearly $620 million in order to 
settle civil and federal government claims related to stock option backdating. The  
complaints came after dozens of companies issued stock options and fraudulently claimed 
the options were granted on earlier dates when stock was trading at a lower price. For more 
information, see Vanessa Fuhrmans & James Bandler, Ex-CEO Agrees to Give Back $620 
Million, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 7, 2007), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119697535545316199. 
88. The London Whale, Bruno Iksil, was a trader in the London Chief Investment 
Office (CIO) of JP Morgan. The CIO was responsible for trading the difference between 
deposits and commercial loans, which was about $350 billion. This money was primarily 
invested in derivatives to hedge risk from other items on the balance sheet. Iksil became 
known by the nickname, London Whale, due to the very large position he took in the CDS 
markets.  In 2012, a massive bet on a complex set of synthetic credit derivatives resulted in  
a loss of $6.2 billion. JP Morgan recovered the maximum amount allowed under its 
employment contracts through a combination of reducing outstanding awards and obtaining 
repayment of awards previously paid. For more information, see S. PERM. SUBCOMM. ON 
INVESTIGATIONS, JPMORGAN CHASE WHALE TRADES: A CASE HISTORY  OF  DERIVATIVES 
RISKS AND ABUSES (2013), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report-jpmorgan-chase- 
whale-trades-a-case-history-of-derivatives-risks-and-abuses-march-15-2013. 
89. Melby & Onaran, supra note 81, at 405. 
90. Greene, supra note 78, at 475. 
91. See Greene, supra note 78, at 475 (noting that Wells Fargo’s clawback provision 
was triggered by financial restatement, which did not occur in connection with the 
fraudulent accounts). 
92. Greene, supra note 78, at 475. 
93. Compare Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2015), with Dodd- 
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enforcements to recoup compensation could result from an employee 
doing the following: exposing the financial institution to inappropriate 
risks; drawing an enforcement action; or exceeding the institution’s risk 
limits and causing a loss.94 In contrast to specific enforcement triggers, 
financial institutions may choose to develop deferred compensation 
provisions with a wide range of enforcement triggers in order to give  
the board of directors broad authority and discretion to enforce the 
provision.95 
Under current Interagency Guidance, financial institutions 
determine their own deferred compensation and clawback policies with 
oversight and guidance from financial regulators.96 Each financial 
institution is responsible for ensuring that its incentive-based 
compensation arrangements are consistent with the safety and  
soundness policy of the institution.97 In addition, financial institutions 
are permitted, and in some cases required, “to incorporate . . . new or 
emerging methods that are likely to improve the organization’s long- 
term financial well-being.”98 However, a compensation policy that is 
effective in one financial institution may not necessarily be effective in 
another institution.99 In order to continue innovation in compensation 
policies, Federal Regulators should continue to monitor and advise 
boards of Covered Institutions as the boards establish compensation 
policies based on the particular needs of the institution and considering 
whether compensation is excessive or could lead to material financial 
loss.100   Moreover,  if  uniform rules  on  incentive-based compensation 
 
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 956, 12 U.S.C. § 
5641 (2015). 
94. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 
37670, 37835–36 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 
C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 
1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, 303 (SEC)). 
95. Greene, supra note 78, at 475–76. 
96. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 10. 
97. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395, 36397 
(June 25, 2010). 
98.    Id. at 36400. 
99. Id. 
100. This position is consistent with the policy under current Interagency Guidance, and 
the policy could be continued under revised guidance. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 
23; Letter from Edward J. DeMarco, Jr., Gen. Counsel and Dir. Regulatory Relations, Risk 
Management Ass’n, to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 
10    (July    20,    2016)    [hereinafter    RMA    Comment    on    Proposed    Rule], https:// 
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policies are adopted, the board of directors of financial institutions are 
likely to use regulatory provisions as a substitute for independent 
discretion.101 
Under the Proposed Rule, Federal Regulators would require 
Covered Institutions with $50 billion or more in assets to defer at least 
40% of incentive-based compensation of SEOs and SRTs for a 
minimum of four years.102 The deferred portion of incentive-based 
compensation would be subject to forfeiture, downward adjustment, and 
clawback.103 Deferred compensation could be forfeited or adjusted 
downward for behavior such as: (i) “poor financial performance”; (ii) 
“inappropriate risk taking”; (iii) “material risk management or control 
failures”; or (iv) “non-compliance with statutory, regulatory, or 
supervisory standards.”104 Similarly, vested compensation would be 
subject to clawback as a result of the following: (i) “misconduct that 
resulted in significant financial or reputational harm to the Covered 
Institution”; (ii) fraud; or (iii) “intentional misrepresentation of 
information used to determine . . . incentive-based compensation.”105 
The severity of the employee’s actions and level of culpability usually 
determine the amount of compensation the Covered Institution will 
recoup.106 
 
C. Categorization of Financial Institutions for Purposes of 
Regulation 
 
When developing compensation policies, Federal Regulators 
and financial institutions must consider the nexus between the actual 
risk  presented  by  incentive-based  compensation  and  the  level  of 
 
www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=OCC-2011- 
00012387&attachmentNumber=1&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf. 
101. RMA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 100, at 9–10 (noting that the 
proposed rule “apparent[ly] shift[s] oversight from the board of directors of the institution to 
the regulatory agencies”). 
102. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 
37670, 37835–36. (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 
C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 
1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)). 
103. Id. 
104.    Id. at 37836. 
105.    Id. at 37837. 
106.    Id. at 37836. 
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regulation.107 For example, the asset size of a financial institution is one 
indicator of the level of risk, but asset size may not directly correlate 
with incentive for excessive risk-taking.108 In addition, certain types of 
activities may expose the institution to more risks than others.109 When 
regulators attempt to decrease risk by regulating the compensation 
arrangements of financial institutions and employees, the policies  
should be tied to the actual risk exposure of each institution based on  
the activities in which the institution is engaged.110 
Despite Federal Regulators’ recognition that asset size is only 
one of many factors to be considered when determining the proper 
incentive-based compensation arrangements,111 in the Proposed Rule, 
regulators relied almost entirely on asset size as an indicator of risk- 
taking activity.112 Typically, Federal Regulators categorize financial 
institutions using asset size, because larger financial institutions 
“implicate[] the greatest risk[] for the broader economy and financial 
system.”113 While size is an important indicator of an institution’s risk, 
asset size alone may not be an accurate indicator of the risk an 
institution imposes on the financial system.114 In some instances, “large 
and diversified institutions pose less risk than those that are smaller but 
highly  concentrated.”115   Moreover,  the failure  of  a large  number  of 
 
107. See McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 52 (concluding 
that the lack of a nexus between risk-taking activity and the restrictions imposed the 
proposed rule will have an anti-competitive effect). 
108. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 
37670, 37688 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 
(FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)). 
109. See id. (“Because of the scalability of the Federal Home Loan Bank business 
model, it is possible for a Federal Home Loan Bank to pass back and forth over the asset- 
size threshold without any meaningful change in risk profile.”) 
110. See generally Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 
36395, 36400 (June 25, 2010) (requiring financial institutions to “take account of the full 
range of risks that the employees’ activities may pose for the organization”). 
111. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
37708 (stating that the agencies are not attempting to apply a “one-size-fits-all” approach to 
designing compensation policies and that the structure of incentive-based compensation 
arrangement should comply with requirements in a manner consistent with the size, 
complexity, risk tolerance, and business model of the individual covered institutions). 
112. See id. at 37837 (applying the most stringent requirements to Level 1 and Level 2 
financial institutions based solely on asset size). 
113.    Id. at 37688. 
114. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. at 36399. 
115. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 3. 
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small banks can create as much systemic risk as the failure of a large 
bank.116 For example, the savings and loan crisis was caused by 
hundreds of thrifts failing due to rising interest rates, unstable funding, 
and high-risk mortgage lending.117 The failure of so many small 
financial institutions ultimately resulted in the failure of the Federal 
Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation.118 
The problem of using asset size as a proxy for risk to the 
financial system is particularly important when subsidiaries are 
regulated based on the asset size of the parent company.119  For  
example, smaller lines of business within a larger Covered Institution 
will be subject to regulations that are not comparable to those imposed 
on similar-sized competitors.120 This problem is particularly important  
in bank holding companies and financial holding companies that are 
Covered Institutions under the Proposed Rule, because these companies 
are more likely to participate in a broad range of financial activities.121   
If the Proposed Rule is finalized, subsidiaries of these Covered 
Institutions will be forced to compete with smaller stand-alone financial 
institutions when recruiting and retaining employees.122 In order to 
compete, the subsidiary may have to increase compensation for covered 
employees or spin off certain subsidiaries.123 For this reason, the risk 
exposure and level of regulation of a subsidiary should be determined 
 
116. Frances Coppola, Big Banks Versus Small Banks: Size Doesn’t Matter, FORBES 
(Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/francescoppola/2013/12/10/big-banks-versus- 
small-banks-size-doesnt-matter/#386e7d4b1d86. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. See Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 
37670, 37780 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 
(FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)) (“[The Proposed Rule] might affect the 
ability of these subsidiaries to compete for managerial talent with stand-alone companies of 
the same size as the subsidiary. If that were the case, the subsidiaries of larger parent 
institutions may have to provide additional pay to individuals to compensate for the 
relatively stricter compensation requirements and prohibitions.”). 
120. See Wells Fargo Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 34, at 4. 
121. For example, a large covered institution could spin off a division into a separate 
financial institution which may not be subject to any compensation rules. See Proposed Rule 
on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 37780. 
122. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
37815; Jesse Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan, 
106 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 759–60 (May 23, 2016). 
123. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
37815. 
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without regard to the parent company.124 
A final rule on incentive-based compensation should, at a 
minimum, provide regulators discretion to regulate a  Covered 
Institution based on the actual level of the risk inherent to the 
institution.125 In order to determine the appropriate standard for each 
Covered Institution, Federal Regulators could consider the activities, 
complexity of operations, risk profile, and compensation practices.126   
As a compromise, the final rule could provide general requirements 
based upon asset size, but provide for relaxed or heightened 
requirements based on the risk to the financial system of a particular 
Covered Institution or its subsidiary.127 Under the latter approach, 
regulators would be afforded a uniform approach to regulating 
compensation while retaining the flexibility to regulate financial 
institutions with similar size, complexity, and overall risk profile in the 
same manner.128 
 
D. Compensation Policies Should Be Tailored to Specific Risk 
Profiles of Employees and Departments 
 
Incentive-based compensation accounts for approximately 50% 
of the compensation paid to employees on Wall Street.129  In addition, 
 
124. See Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 76 Fed. Reg. 
21170, 21202–17 (proposed Apr. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 
C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. §563h (OTS); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 
751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 248 (SEC)) (applying the 
restrictions to individual institutions without additional restrictions on subsidiaries based on 
the parent company’s assets). 
125. For example, the Proposed Rule provides a reservation of authority for Level 3 
institutions, which permits regulators to require a Level 3 institution to comply with some or 
all of the requirements of Level 1 or Level 2 institutions when the Level 3 institution has 
between $10 billion and $50 billion in assets. The reverse would allow a Level 1 or Level 2 
Covered Institution to comply with the regulation of as if it were a Level 3 Covered 
Institution. See Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 37670, 37715 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 
C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 
1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)). 
126. Id. 
127. See id. (allowing regulators discretion to regulate Level 3 Covered Institutions in 
the same manner as Level 1 or Level 2 Covered Institutions). 
128. Id. 
129. Donna Borak, Andrew Ackerman & Christina Rexrode, New Rules Curbing Wall 
Street Pay Proposed, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/new-rules- 
curbing-wall-street-pay-announced-1461247600. 
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the top 5% of employees at the country’s top six banks would include a 
total of 52,000 employees.130 Any compensation rule implemented by 
Federal Regulators will affect the pay structures of a large portion of 
those employees.131 Many of these employees, however, may  not 
expose the financial institutions to excessive risk of material loss.132 In 
order to avoid overregulation, Covered Institutions and Federal 
Regulators should focus on the particular risk exposure of certain 
employees and groups of employees.133 For  example,  certain 
employees may expose the Covered Institution to excessive risk by the 
nature of their salary or degree of control over the institution.134 
Similarly, a group of employees with relatively little control over the 
Covered Institution may expose the institution to excessive risk based 
on the aggregate risk exposure of the group.135 
The approach under the Interagency Guidance is for financial 
institutions to consider the full range of inherent risk arising from an 
employee’s activities and whether those risks are material to either the 
organization, or a business line or operating unit of the organization.136 
If the employee exposes the organization to material risk, then the 
employee will be considered a covered employee or material risk taker 
(“MRT”)  and  subject  to  limits  or  restrictions  on  incentive-based 
 
130. Id. 
131. See Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 
at 37815 (applying the SEO definition to any employee in a control function and applying 
the SRT definition would include anyone with one-third incentive-based compensation who 
is either in top 5% of highest paid employees or could potentially expose 0.5% of the 
institution’s assets). 
132. See id. at 37695 (stating that the purpose of the exposure text is to determine 
whether the employee exposes the institution to market risk or credit risk); see also 
McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29 (stating that financial advisors 
do not expose the institution to credit risk or market risk). 
133. Current Interagency Guidance allows financial institutions to determine covered 
employees based on the ability to expose the institution to material amounts of risk. 
Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395, 36399 (June 25, 
2010). 
134. See Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 
37670, 37808 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 
(FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)) (applying the exposure test and relative 
compensation test to determine significant risk takers). 
135. See Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. at 36399 
(requiring financial institutions to examine risk exposure of employees and groups of 
employees who together can expose the institution to material risk of loss). 
136. Id. 
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compensation.137 This framework deems an employee an MRT based 
upon the risk directly related to his or her employment, and seeks to 
appropriately determine which employees could take the type of 
inappropriate risks that could lead to material financial loss.138 
The alternative approach in the Proposed Rule imposes a more 
uniform test to determine the significant risk takers (“SRTs”) of a 
Covered Institution.139 The SRT determination rests on the relative 
compensation test and exposure test to discern whether the risk  
exposure of an employee is excessive.140 The SRT test covers the most 
highly compensated employees of the Covered Institution and those 
who have the ability to expose 0.5% of the capital of a Covered 
Institution.141 The more rigid SRT approach  may  cover  more 
employees than the MRT approach and subject certain individuals to 
compensation restrictions who do not necessarily expose the financial 
institution to excessive risks.142 
The exposure test, in particular, could cover a broad range of 
employees, because it does not require that the employee actually 
expose the Covered Institution to any commitment of capital.143 For 
example, the Proposed Rule assumes a loan officer exceeds the 
threshold for the SRT test if the employee does not have an annual limit 
of loan authority.144 Accordingly, a loan officer with authority to 
approve $1,000 loans to each customer would be considered an SRT if 
 
137.    Id. at 36407. 
138. Id.; Letter from BB&T Corp. et al., to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., et al., 9–10. (July 22, 2016) [hereinafter Regional  
Banks Comment on Proposed Rule], https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2016/August/ 
20160826/R-1536/R-1536_072816_130383_335536110847_1.pdf. 
139. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
37808. 
140. The relative compensation test depends upon whether the covered employee is 
among the highest 5% of covered employees at a level 1 covered institution or among the 
highest 2% of compensation at a level 2 Covered Institution. The exposure test depends on 
whether the employee can expose at least 0.5% of tier 1 capital.  See id. at 37833. 
141. Id. 
142. See id. at 37693–96 (“[E]xposure test relates to a covered person’s authority to 
commit or expose significant amounts of an institution’s capital, regardless of whether or  
not such exposures or commitments are realized.”). 
143. Id. 
144. See id. at 37696 (“If a covered person had no specific maximum amount of lending 
for the year, but instead his or her lending was subject to approval on a rolling basis, then  
the covered person would be assumed to have an authorized annual lending amount in  
excess of the 0.5% threshold.”). 
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the financial institution does not place annual limit on the number of 
loans she could make.145 Although some banks may not limit  the 
amount of loans that a loan officer may make, each loan is heavily 
scrutinized prior to its approval, thus limiting the particular loan 
officer’s ability to expose the bank to risk through ill-advised loans.146 
In either case, the loan officer would be subject to compensation 
restrictions, regardless of whether she actually exercised her lending 
authority, and even if every transaction she participated in was subject 
to further approval.147 In order to remove this unintended application,  
the SRT test should measure the risk exposure of the employee through 
actual commitments of capital.148 
In addition, certain financial advisors would be considered 
SRTs, but not all financial advisors are capable of causing the strategic, 
market, and liquidity risk that the rule is intended to eliminate.149 For 
example, a financial advisor who invests capital for unrelated third 
parties could be categorized as an SRT.150 Moreover, many financial 
advisors subject to incentive-based compensation restrictions are 
employed inside large banks.151 The financial advisors employed by 
banks could face more stringent compensation restrictions than a 
financial advisor who does similar work for an independent firm.152 
Even though financial advisors who primarily handle client money in a 
large bank pose a similar risk to the financial system as a financial 
advisor in a stand-alone institution, the financial advisor within a large 
bank will face more strict compensation restrictions.153 
Overall, industry professionals have indicated that the 
framework in the Proposed Rule does not reflect how Covered 
Institutions   calculate   employee   responsibilities   and    authority    in 
 
145. Id. 
146. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 23. 
147. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
37696. 
148. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 22. 
149. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 20. 
150. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 20. 
151. Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan, 
supra note 122. 
152. Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan, 
supra note 122. 
153. Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan, 
supra note 122. 
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practice.154 For example, an employee in a sales capacity may receive a 
high level of compensation relative to other employees, but the 
employee’s sales may be subject to strict review and the employee may 
have little authority to make final commitments on behalf of the 
institution.155 Moreover, authorized limits for commitments may be 
expressed in terms other than as a percentage of capital and may not be 
easily translated into terms based on capital.156 For these reasons, many 
industry professionals suggested excluding employees with 
compensation below a certain threshold from the SRT and SEO tests.157 
A compromise of using the MRT approach and giving compensation 
levels more weight in the determination would provide a more 
reasonable method for deciding which employees might expose the 
Covered Institution to excessive risk of material loss.158 
 
III. INCENTIVE-BASED COMPENSATION CONTINUES TO BE A PROBLEM IN 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
In the fall of 2016, Wells Fargo came under fire for its 
compensation policies when the bank settled with regulators over the 
creation of fraudulent accounts.159 The Los Angeles  Times  initially 
broke the story that over two million fake accounts were created by 
front-line employees who were under pressure to meet unrealistic sales 
 
 
154. ABA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 30, at 5 (“[E]ach covered institution 
has its own risk governance model, policies and procedures, the allocation of authority for 
business decisions is divided in ways that are unique to the institution.”) (citing Guidance on 
Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395 (June 25, 2010)). 
155. ABA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 30, at 3. 
156. ABA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 30, at 5 (“For most bank personnel, 
risk limits are not set in reference to ability to commit a specific amount  of the  firm’s 
capital. In fact, for most risk takers in banks, it is not possible to convert their authorities  
into a capital-based measure, at least not without making assumptions that are likely to  
prove unrealistic or inaccurate, leading to results in conflict with the Agencies’ intent.”) 
157. See McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 9 (suggesting a 
$200,000 threshold for covered employees and $1 million threshold for SRTs); see also 
Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 137, at 9 (suggesting an exclusion 
for employees whose incentive-based compensation does not exceed $50,000). 
158. See McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 16 (noting that 
the SRT and SRT approach can be implemented into the current MRT framework). 
159. See e.g., Jeff Bater, Wells Fargo to Pay $185 Million for Unauthorized Bank 
Accounts, 107 Banking Rep. No. 9, at 305 (Sept. 12, 2016) (“Wells Fargo will pay $185 
million in penalties and $5 million in remediation over allegations its employees secretly 
opened unauthorized accounts to hit sales targets . . . .”). 
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goals.160 Much of the responsibility for the scandal fell on John Stumpf, 
the CEO of Wells Fargo, and Carrie Tolstedt, the executive in charge of 
the community banking unit.161 Both have resigned and forfeited 
unvested bonuses totaling $60 million.162 Although the total cost to the 
institution is difficult to calculate, the bank faces total fines of $185 
million from the OCC, CFPB, and State of California.163 The  Wells 
Fargo scandal has raised alarms that banks may not have effective 
policies to monitor and mitigate excessively risky behavior by their 
employees.164 Moreover, the scandal occurred while Federal Regulators 
were in the process of finalizing rules on incentive-based compensation 
under Section 956 of  Dodd-Frank.165  The  Proposed  Rule,  however, 
may not have prevented the scandal even if it were finalized in advance 
of the scandal, causing some to suggest the rules should be more 
stringent than originally proposed.166 
Wells Fargo was fined substantially for the fraudulent practices 
 
 
160. James Rufus Koren, Wells Fargo to Pay $185 Million Settlement for ‘Outrageous’ 
Sales Culture, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells- 
fargo-settlement-20160907-snap-story.html; E. Scott. Reckard, Wells Fargo’s Pressure- 
cooker Sales Culture Comes at a Cost, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2013), http:// 
www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-wells-fargo-sale-pressure-20131222-story.html. 
161. Jenny Surane & Elizabeth Dexheimer, Stumpf Pay Surrender Buys Time but 
Lawmakers Say It’s Not Enough, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 435–36 (Sept. 28, 
2016). 
162. Id. (noting that Stumpf forfeited approximately $41 million and Toldst forfeited 
approximately $19 million). 
163. In the Matter of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., CFPB No. 2016-CFPB-0015 (Sept. 4, 
2016); In the Matter of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., OCC No. 2016-079 (Sept. 6, 2016); State  
of California v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. BC580778 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 2016) (consent 
order); see also Greene, supra note 78, at 475; Surane and Dexheimer, supra note 160. 
164. See Jeff Bater, Wells Fargo Scandal Prompts Regulator to Take Closer Look at 
Peers’ Practices, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 11, at 397 (Sept. 26, 2016) (reporting that 
the OCC has begun an investigation into bank sales practices in response to the Wells Fargo 
scandal). 
165. See, e.g., Menendez Letter, supra note 15 (asking Federal Regulators to strengthen 
and finalize proposed rules under Section 956 of Dodd-Frank). 
166. It is unlikely the front-line employees engaged in the sales practices would have 
been covered by the proposed rule. SEOs and SRTs are generally employees who (a) are in 
charge of a line of business; (b) have the authority to expose large amounts of capital; or (c) 
receive the highest compensation relative to others in the same division. See Proposed Rule 
on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37670, 37833–34 (proposed 
June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 
372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 
240, 275, & 303 (SEC)). Moreover, the CEO and Director of Community Banking, who 
likely would have been covered by the Proposed Rule, voluntarily forfeited approximately 
$60 million in the wake of the scandal.  Surane & Dexheimer, supra note 160, at 435. 
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of its employees, and the bank continues to face additional costs and 
threats of litigation.167 In addition to fines levied by the OCC, CFPB,  
and State of California, several states and municipalities  have 
suspended business with Wells Fargo.168 For example, California, the 
bank’s home state, along with Illinois, Ohio, and Massachusetts have 
suspended state bond deals with Wells Fargo because of the scandal.169 
Similarly, the cities of San Francisco, Chicago, and Seattle have 
suspended business deals with the bank.170 The bank also  faces  
potential investigations from the Department of  Justice and SEC, as  
well as lawsuits from former customers, employees, and  
shareholders.171 After the scandal was reported, a complaint was filed  
for securities law violations, and shareholders initiated a lawsuit related 
to the 9% drop in the stock price.172  Although the total extent of the   
loss to Wells Fargo is yet to be determined, the bank certainly faces a 
negative public perception after the scandal.173 
The Wells Fargo scandal has led financial regulators and 
financial institutions to evaluate incentive-based compensation 
 
 
167. Kartikay Mehrotra, Laura J. Keller & Romy Varghese, Wells Fargo Wants Quiet 
End to Scandal, Risking More Noise, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 813 (Dec. 12, 
2016) (noting that in addition to fines, the bank faces investigation from federal agencies, 
another federal department, state attorneys general, prosecutors’ offices and congressional 
committees). 
168. E.g., Romy Varghese, Massachusetts Becomes Latest State to Penalize Wells 
Fargo, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 545 (Oct. 24, 2016). 
169. Id. 
170. Romy Varghese, Wells Fargo Faces Heat From Home State Officials After CEO 
Exit, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 544 (Oct. 24, 2016). 
171. Pamela Maclean & Laura J. Keller, Wells Fargo Bogus-Account Scandal Said to 
Draw DOJ Investigation, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 359 (Sept. 19, 2016) (DOJ 
Investigation); Kartikay Mehrotra, Wells Fargo Sued by Shareholders Over Cross-Selling 
Scandal, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 452 (Oct. 3, 2016) (Shareholder Suit); Rob 
Tricchinelli, Senators Ask for SEC Probe of Wells Fargo, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 13, 
at 479 (Oct. 10, 2016) (SEC Investigation); Kartikay Mehrotra, Wells Fargo Ex-Managers’ 
Suit Puts Scandal Blame Higher Up Chain, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 834 (Dec. 
12, 2016) (Former Employee Lawsuit); Chris Bruce, Wells Fargo Faces $5 Million Lawsuit 
on Unauthorized Accounts, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 11 (Sept. 26, 2016) (Customer 
Lawsuit). 
172. Mehrotra, Wells Fargo Sued by Shareholders Over Cross-Selling Scandal, supra 
note 171. 
173. Lucinda Shen, Wells Fargo Scandal Could End Up Costing Bank $8 Billion, 
FORTUNE (Oct. 25, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/10/24/wells-fargos-scandal-could-end- 
up-costing-bank-8-billion/ (reporting that the scandal affected just 3% of Wells Fargo 
customers and so far, has had little effect on revenue, but public opinion has fallen 
dramatically, with 14% of customers deciding to bank elsewhere). 
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policies.174 For example, the OCC is evaluating compensation 
arrangements in certain financial institutions.175 The OCC sent a letter  
to financial institutions under its regulatory authority requesting 
information about the institutions’ compensation policies.176  The OCC 
is also working with other regulators to ensure no other financial 
institutions have sales practices that encourage employees to open 
accounts without customer authorization.177 In addition, Wells Fargo  
has eliminated product sales goals for its retail banking team and 
eliminated bonuses for mortgage brokers in response to the scandal.178  
In a Bloomberg Television interview, Paul Miller, an analyst at FBR 
Capital Markets, said that Wells Fargo’s rivals also needed to be 
sensitive to risk exposure of employees, because he is “very concerned 
that regulators will really dig, [and come] after these banks 
aggressively.”179 At least one large financial institution, JPMorgan 
Chase, has proactively conducted a review of its compensation policies 
since the news broke regarding Wells Fargo.180 JPMorgan addressed 
minor issues in its incentive-based compensation policy, but did not find 
any systemic risks.181 
Lawmakers on Capitol Hill have also expressed concerns about 
the Wells Fargo scandal.182 Both sides of the political spectrum have 
weighed in on the scandal, with Republicans questioning the 
effectiveness of the CFPB and Democrats calling for tougher 
regulations.183       The    Senate    Banking    Committee    conducted an 
 
174. E.g., Hugh Son & Jordyn Holman, JPMorgan Conducts ‘Deep Dive’ Review After 
Wells Fargo Lapse, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 511 (Oct. 17, 2016); Jesse 
Hamilton, Wall Street Banks to Face On-Site Reviews of Sales Practices, 107 Banking Rep. 
(BNA) No. 16, at 575 (Oct. 31, 2016). 
175. Emily Glazer & Christina Rexrode, Big U.S. Retail Bank Operations Under 
Scrutiny After Wells Scandal, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/big- 
u-s-retail-bank-operations-under-scrutiny-follow-wells-scandal-1477400747; Hamilton, 
Wall Street Banks to Face On-Site Reviews of Sales Practices, supra note 174. 
176. Glazer & Rexrode, supra note 175. 
177. Hamilton, Wall Street Banks to Face On-Site Reviews of Sales Practices, supra 
note 174, at 575. 
178. Son & Holman, supra note 174; Laura J. Keller, Wells Fargo to Stop Paying 
Brokers Bonuses for Selling Loans, 107 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 23, at 862 (Dec. 19, 
2016). 
179. Son & Holman, supra note 174. 
180. Son & Holman, supra note 174. 
181. Son & Holman, supra note 174. 
182. Menendez Letter, supra note 15. 
183. Yuka Hayashi, Political Fight Over CFPB Heats Up After Wells Fargo Scandal, 
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investigation into the scandal, and the House Financial Services 
Committee is also investigating the matter.184 Senate Democrats have 
even questioned KPMG, the one-time independent auditor of Wells 
Fargo, about its failure to catch the abuse of the system.185 Others have 
noted that the OCC and CFPB discovered the practices at Wells Fargo  
as early as 2012.186 Neither the OCC nor the CFPB, however, brought 
formal action against Wells Fargo when the sales practices first came to 
light.187 
As a result of the Wells Fargo scandal, regulators will likely 
become more involved in compensation arrangements in financial 
institutions.188 If regulators do not enforce existing rules, however, 
additional regulations are unlikely to improve compensation policies.189 
Even with regulatory oversight, Wells Fargo was able to continue the 
scheme for several years and was not formally punished when the 
fraudulent practices were initially reported.190 Comptroller Curry stated 
that the 2016 Proposed Rule would have prevented the sales practices at 
Wells Fargo.191 However, the OCC discovered the improper sales 
practices at Wells Fargo as early as 2012 and failed to effectively 
address the matter.192 Although lawmakers are pressuring regulators to 
toughen rules on incentive-based compensation, regulators could have 
initiated enforcement action under current rules and guidance.193 
Perhaps Congress should allow Federal Regulators to focus on 
effectively  enforcing  and  monitoring  financial  institutions  under the 
 
 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/political-fight-over-cfpb-heats- 
up-after-wells-fargo-scandal-1474582741. 
184. Surane & Dexheimer, supra note 160. 
185. Mont, supra note 35. 
186. Akshat Tewary, OCC Deserves More Scrutiny in Wake of Wells Fargo Fraud, AM. 
BANKER (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/occ-deserves-more- 
scrutiny-in-wake-of-wells-fraud. 
187. Id. 
188. See Hamilton, Wells Fargo Scandal Hurts Wall Street’s Fight Against Pay Rules, 
supra note 16. 
189. Hamilton, Wells Fargo Scandal Hurts Wall Street’s Fight Against Pay Rules, supra 
note 16. 
190. Hayashi, supra note 183. 
191. Hearing Related to Unsafe and Unsound Sales Practices at Wells Fargo Before the 
S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2016) [hereinafter Senate 
Hearing] (testimony of Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency). 
192. Tewary, supra note 186. 
193. Tewary, supra note 186. 
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current rules rather than pressuring regulators to adopt new 
regulations.194 
Had the Proposed Rule been in effect before Wells Fargo’s 
scandalous conduct, it is difficult to determine whether or not Wells 
Fargo would have altered its practices, thus avoiding its troubles.195 
While the CEO and Director of Community Banking would have been 
subject to the downward adjustment and clawback provisions of the 
Proposed Rule, the 5,300 employees at Wells Fargo who were fired 
leading up to the scandal likely would not have been subject to the more 
stringent pay restrictions of the Proposed Rule.196 Moreover, even 
without a regulation requiring recoupment of compensation, the CEO 
and Director of Community Banking, who both resigned in the wake of 
the scandal, forfeited a substantial amount of income.197 In total, the 
CEO and Director of Community Banking forfeited $60 million in 
unvested compensation.198 Furthermore, Wells Fargo has eliminated the 
aggressive sales practices from its retail banking division and shifted 
more pay towards salary and less toward incentive-based 
compensation.199 
In order to address other risks and prevent future scandals, 
Federal Regulators must ensure financial institutions are  complying 
with  current  regulations  and  guidance.200   Federal  Regulators should 
 
194. See Tewary, supra note 186 (“No federal regulator ever stepped up to the plate to 
initiate a punitive investigation against [Wells Fargo].”). 
195. See Tewary, supra note 186 (“Section 956 was crafted to protect banks from 
excessive risk-taking by bonus-seeking managers and traders. It will do little to protect 
customers from dishonest retail banking practices like those perpetrated at Wells Fargo, 
especially where those practices do not rise to the level of threatening the overall fiscal 
health of the offending bank.”). 
196. SEOs and SRTs are generally employees who (a) are in charge of a line of 
business; (b) have the authority to expose large amounts of capital; or (c) receive the highest 
compensation relative to others in the same division. See Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based 
Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 37670, 37833–34 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to 
be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 
C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 
(SEC)). 
197. Greene, supra note 78, at 475; Surane & Dexheimer, supra note 161, at 435. 
198. Surane & Dexheimer, supra note 160, at 435. 
199. The most stringent requirements only apply to SEO and SRT, which are generally 
employees who: are in charge of a line of business; who have the authority to expose large 
amounts of capital; or who receive the highest compensation relative to others in their 
division. See Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 
at 37835–38. 
200. See James R. Koren, Federal Regulator Launches Broad Review of Banks’ Sales 
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continue to monitor compensation arrangements to minimize excessive 
risk in financial institutions.201 Likewise, financial institutions should 
continue to monitor their compensation policies and ensure compliance 
with safe and sound banking practices as outlined in the Interagency 
Guidance.202 Regardless of whether the Proposed Rule could have 
prevented the scandal, Federal Regulators are under increasing pressure 
to implement tougher rules.203 Due to political pressure, regulators are 
likely to monitor sales practices more closely in financial institutions 
going forward, even if the Proposed Rule does not go into effect.204 
 
IV. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF OVER-REGULATING INCENTIVE- 
BASED COMPENSATION 
 
Financial institutions and their employees are sensitive to 
increased regulation of incentive-based compensation arrangements.205 
When Federal Regulators initially proposed rules pursuant to Section 
956 of Dodd-Frank, industry professionals and advocacy groups 
submitted over 10,000 comments.206 Many of the comments discuss the 
unintended consequences of the Proposed Rule, which could negatively 
affect  the  financial  industry.207     The  unintended  consequences  of 
 
Practices, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-bank-sales- 
review-20161025-snap-story.html (noting that the OCC is currently requesting information 
from financial institutions and coordinating with other bank regulators to review 
compensation policies); Tewary, supra note 184 (opining that regulators should have acted 
sooner to prevent the stop the unlawful sales practices at Wells Fargo). 
201. See Son & Holman, supra note 174 (noting that other banks should examine their 
compensation policies because regulators will monitor banks more closely after the Wells 
Fargo scandal). 
202. HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 15. 
203. Menendez Letter, supra note 15. 
204. See Menendez Letter, supra note 15 (requesting regulators to include more 
stringent requirements in the proposed rule); see also Jeff Bater, OCC Flags Sales Practices 
at Banks in Semiannual Risk Report, 108 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 65 (Jan 9, 2017) 
(noting that the OCC continues to review sales practices in other large and midsize banks 
and has added governance of sales practice as a key risk that can negatively affect public 
trust in the financial industry). 
205. See generally Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 
Fed. Reg. 37670, 37677 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 
12 C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)) (noting that Federal Regulators 
received over 10,000 comments when rules were initially proposed under Section 956). 
206. Id. 
207. E.g., McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29; Wells Fargo 
Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 34; Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, 
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potential rules must be fully reviewed when regulators are considering 
the appropriate level of regulation for incentive-based compensation 
arrangements.208 First, overregulation of compensation can lead to 
increased or unfair competition for employees between a Covered 
Institution and its less regulated competitors.209 Second, rigid 
compensation policies could reduce the incentive for Covered 
Institutions to develop new and innovative compensation policies.210 
Finally, if regulation adversely affects incentive-based compensation, 
employees may devalue incentive-based compensation and demand 
more compensation be paid in the form of fixed compensation.211 
 
A. Covered Employees May Leave Financial Institutions for Less 
Regulated Entities 
 
One of the most serious unintended results of overregulation of 
compensation is that the regulation will negatively affect a Covered 
Institution’s ability to recruit and retain talented employees.212 For 
instance, competition for talent between large Covered Institutions and 
less-regulated, smaller Covered Institutions may result in more talented 
employees choosing the less-regulated institutions.213   Moreover, when 
 
 
supra note 138. 
208. See HORIZONTAL REVIEW, supra note 2, at 10 (“The interagency guidance helps to 
avoid the potential hazards or unintended consequences that would be associated with rigid, 
one-size-fits-all supervisory limits or formulas.”); see also McGuireWoods Comment on 
Proposed Rule, supra note 29 (“[T]he prescriptive nature of the Proposed Rules fossilizes 
current compensation practices and prevents innovation that appropriately balances risks  
and rewards and allows financial institutions to adjust their compensation practices.”). 
209. Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan, 
supra note 122. 
210. See generally McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29 (“[T]he 
prescriptive nature of the Proposed Rules fossilizes current compensation practices and 
prevents innovation that appropriately balances risks and rewards and allows financial 
institutions to adjust their compensation practices.”). 
211. See Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan, 
supra note 122 (noting that companies affected the proposed rule may have to pay more to 
stay competitive or to make up for stricter requirements). 
212. Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan, 
supra note 122; Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138. 
213. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 
37670, 37780 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 
(FHFA); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, 303 (SEC)); Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a 
Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan, supra note 122. 
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Covered Institutions compete for talent with other industries that are not 
subject to financial regulation, employees may choose to leave the 
financial industry altogether.214 Overall, this level of competition for 
talent requires innovative compensation policies that allow Covered 
Institutions to compensate employees based on the needs of the 
particular institution.215 
When Covered Institutions compete for relatively similar talent 
regardless of asset size, regulations that increase restrictions based on 
asset size place larger Covered Institutions at a competitive 
disadvantage.216 Specifically, if an employee has a choice of either 
working at a large Covered Institution with income subject to 
compensation restrictions or a smaller Covered Institution with little or 
no restriction, then the employee is likely to choose the smaller Covered 
Institution.217 In addition, as subsidiaries are treated the same as their 
top-tier parent company, subsidiaries are further disadvantaged in the 
competition for talent against stand-alone institutions.218 In order to 
overcome this competition, large Covered Institutions may decide to 
overpay in order to attract and retain the same talent.219 Paying 
employees higher salaries could increase the Covered Institution’s risk 
profile and prevent the institution from reacting to economic 
downturns.220 
The most successful financial advisors would be most affected 
by the proposed rule, and therefore most likely leave a covered 
institution  for  an  unregulated  competitor.221   Financial  advisors with 
 
 
214. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 11. 
215. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 11. 
216. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
37780; McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 3. 
217. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 21. 
218. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. 
37670, 37780 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 1232 
(FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)). 
219. Id. at 37778; Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over 
JPMorgan, supra note 122. 
220. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 10. 
221. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 20; see also 
Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan, supra note 
122 (“Of the 669 registered investment advisers subject to the rule, the SEC estimated only 
18 would face the toughest level of regulation. Many  of those are inside banks, and even  
the world’s largest money manager, BlackRock, doesn’t have enough proprietary assets to 
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income sufficient to meet the compensation requirements of the 
Proposed Rule are also most likely to have the financial mobility to 
move to another financial institution.222 These financial advisors would 
likely find the mandatory deferral provisions unacceptable,  and 
therefore leave larger, more diversified Covered Institutions for 
employment in smaller institutions that are not subject to the 
regulation.223 Removing successful financial advisors from Covered 
Institutions would eliminate a diversified revenue stream, which may be 
unrelated to excessive risk-taking.224 This problem directly results from 
regulating subsidiaries at the level of the top-tier parent company.225 
Financial advisors employed by large banks would be subject to the  
most stringent requirements, but even the largest stand-alone financial 
management firms do not have sufficient assets to fall into the top tier  
of regulation.226 
This problem also presents issues with competition for talent 
between smaller regional Covered Institutions and larger Covered 
Institutions.227  In a regional bank with fewer high-earning employees in 
a specific division, employees in that division may be deemed SRTs 
based on the relative compensation test.228 For example, a covered 
employee in a small capital markets division at a regional bank could be 
designated  an  SRT  based  on  relative  compensation,  but  the  same 
 
put it in the top tier.”). 
222. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 20. 
223. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 20. 
224. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 20. See Hamilton, 
Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan, supra note 122 (“Asset 
managers have become especially valuable for banks in recent years, bolstering profit 
margins with their steady fee-based income as firms face pressures on lending and trading 
revenue.”). 
225. “The proposed rule would subject covered institution subsidiaries of a depository 
institution holding company that is a Level 1 or Level 2 covered institution to the same 
requirements as the depository institution holding company. . . . The main disadvantage of 
such approach is that it may impose requirements and prohibitions on individuals employed 
in smaller subsidiaries that are less likely to be in a position to expose the institution to 
significant risks.” Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 37670, 37780 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 
C.F.R. § 236 (FRB); 12 C.F.R. § 372 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 741, 751 (NCUA); 12 C.F.R. § 
1232 (FHFA); & 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 275, & 303 (SEC)). 
226. See Hamilton, Pay Rule May Give BlackRock a Recruiting Boost Over JPMorgan, 
supra note 121 (noting that even the largest independent money manager does not have 
sufficient assets to fall under the top tier of regulation). 
227. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 2. 
228. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 10. 
  
 
2017] INCENTIVE-BASED COMPENSATION REFORM 459 
employee may not be an SRT at a large national bank with a larger 
number of high-earning employees.229 Moreover, since the SRT 
determination is based on the level of income relative to the Covered 
Institution’s other employees, an employee could fall in and out of the 
SRT definition from year to year.230 This volatility may be enough to 
drive talent to other institutions.231 
Employees in non-risk taking support functions could also be 
subject to restrictions of the Proposed Rule by virtue of their 
employment at a Covered Institution.232 Covered Institutions employ 
many employees in fields not specifically related to the financial 
industry, particularly those who specialize in technology, human 
resources, law, and compliance.233 These employees are the most likely 
to find other industries attractive.234 One way the Covered Institution  
can attract these employees into the financial industry is by providing 
incentive-based compensation arrangements.235 An incentive-based 
compensation arrangement not only provides the employee with an 
incentive to work in the financial industry, but also allows the Covered 
Institution to adjust the compensation in periods of economic 
downturn.236 In sum, the  incentive-based  compensation  structure 
benefits both the institution and the individual employee.237 In some 
cases, these employees are actually engaged in activities that reduce the 
risk of loss to the Covered Institution.238 Including these employees in 
the SEO and SRT definitions does little to reduce risks from incentive 
compensation and makes it more difficult for the financial institution to 
attract and retain high-quality employees with sought-after expertise.239 
In addition, the potential volatility in pay from year to year could 
actually subject financial institutions to additional risks associated with 
difficulty  in  attracting  and  retaining  high-quality  talent  in  non-risk 
 
229. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 10. 
230. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 11. 
231. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 11. 
232. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 11. 
233. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 11. 
234. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 11. 
235. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 2. 
236. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 11. 
237. See generally McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 27, at 2. 
238. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 10. 
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taking roles.240 
B. Uniform Rules May Discourage Innovative Compensation 
Policies 
 
With a new rule proposed on incentive-based compensation, 
most Covered Institutions will wait for the final rule before making any 
major changed to their pay programs.241 If the Proposed Rule is 
finalized, Covered Institutions could incorrectly conclude that the 
standards set by the Federal Regulators are sufficient to fit their risk 
profiles.242 Therefore, the Proposed Rule could discourage or inhibit 
institutions from developing new and innovative compensation 
arrangements.243 In some cases, complex, uniform rules make it more 
difficult for the board of directors to oversee a company, while making 
it easier to simply game the system.244 In order to avoid the 
aforementioned issues, the board of directors of a Covered Institutions 
must continue to develop appropriate and innovative compensation 
practices.245 
A financial institution should have the ability, with oversight 
from Federal Regulators, to determine whether its employees are 
exposing the financial institution to material risk of loss.246 As 
previously noted, financial institutions need the ability to develop 
compensation strategies that fit within their size, complexity, business 
strategy, and risk profiles.247 The board of directors of financial 
institutions must more closely monitor compensation policies to ensure 
that the policies do not encourage employees to take excessive risks.248 
 
 
240. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 10. 
241. Greene, supra note 78. 
242. RMA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 100, at 9–10 (noting that the 
proposed rule “apparent[ly] shift[s] oversight from the board of directors to the regulators 
agencies”). 
243. McGuireWoods Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 29, at 32. 
244. Greene, supra note 78. 
245. See Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 13 
(“[I]nstitutions should be responsible for designating their employees as SRTs in accordance 
with principles and rules articulated by the agencies.”). 
246. Regional Banks Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 138, at 13. 
247. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36395, 36406 
(June 25, 2010). 
248. Greene, supra note 78. 
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Flexibility in compensation rules encourages the board of directors to 
innovate and develop new ways to reduce the risk in incentive-based 
compensation.249 In order to promote further innovation, Federal 
Regulators could encourage more board oversight rather than 
implementing uniform rules,250 and Federal Regulators  could 
supplement board discretion by implementing recordkeeping and 
documentation of compensation enforcement actions.251 
 
C. Strict Rules on Compensation Could Result in Increased 
Compensation 
 
Uniform rules on compensation can increase the exact problems 
the rules are meant to prohibit.252 Analysis of past legislation and 
regulation of compensation suggests that additional rules are “generally 
either ineffective or counterproductive.”253 For example, IRS rules 
limiting the deductibility in non-incentive pay actually led to increases 
in pay through additional stock options and other incentive 
compensation plans.254 Similarly, SEC rules requiring disclosure of pay 
and benchmarking used to determine pay actually provided firms a 
justification for higher pay based on pay of similar firms.255 When 
regulating  incentive-based  compensation,  increased  regulation  could 
 
 
249. ABA Comment on Proposed Rule, supra note 30, at 2. 
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Rule require financial institutions to make additional information available to Federal 
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Reg. 37670, 37803 (proposed June 10, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 42 (OCC); 12 
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111/verret.pdf. 
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(Dec. 12, 2012), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/12/12/the-dynamics-of- 
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254. See Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and Accidents: Regulation of Executive 
Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 485, 521–23 (2009) 
(noting that the initial result was for executives to receive an increase in base  
compensation). 
255. Faulkender & Yang, supra note 253. 
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result in devaluation of incentive-based pay, and therefore, employees 
may demand more pay be attributed to salary rather than based on 
performance.256 
Prior federal efforts to reduce executive compensation have 
actually resulted in increased compensation for executives.257 Federal 
income tax legislation in 1992 limited the deduction for compensation  
to top executives at $1 million.258 The limit on deductions only applied 
to pay that was not tied to performance.259 While the intention was to 
limit executive pay compared to that of the average worker, the result 
was to shift more of executive compensation to performance-based 
pay.260 In response to the rule, firms set base pay at $1 million and 
increased compensation through performance-based policies.261 
Similarly, the SEC attempted to reign in executive compensation by 
requiring firms to disclose the amount of executive compensation, 
including the method used to determine compensation, such as 
comparison among peer firms.262 When more information about 
executive pay was made public, executives could justify higher 
compensation based on the pay of similarly situated executives in peer 
companies.263 Moreover, a firm could adjust its peer group so its CEO 
was in the median of CEOs for the peer group.264 In both cases, 
following the additional restrictions on certain aspects of compensation, 
the result was an increase in overall compensation for executives.265 
In the present case, the Proposed Rule could result in an  
increase  in  overall  compensation,  because  employees  will  devalue 
 
256. Proposed Rule on Incentive-Based Compensation Arrangements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 
37790 (“[T]he relatively long clawback horizon may generate uncertainty regarding 
incentive-based compensation of [SEOs] and [SRTs]. . . . As a response to the potentially 
increased uncertainty, senior executive officers and significant risk-takers may demand 
higher levels of overall compensation, or substitution of incentive-based compensation with 
other forms of compensation such as salary.”). 
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incentive-based compensation and therefore, demand more fixed 
compensation.266 If incentive-based compensation is deferred for long 
periods of time, employees may find fixed compensation more 
desirable.267 When incentive-based compensation is deferred, an 
employee may place a lower value on the compensation for several 
reasons including: a discount for a delay in payment; risk of loss due to 
termination of employment; risk of loss due to failure to attain 
performance goals; discounted value for stock market risk if 
compensation is equity-based; and a discount for risk of clawbacks.268 
Each of these factors creates a significant gap in the value of deferred 
compensation and the value of the compensation when the employee 
earns the incentive-based compensation.269 Specifically, the aggregate 
discount under the Proposed Rule can be as high as 35% based on all 
discount factors.270 Furthermore, if employers are withholding the 
employees’ compensation and using it for the company’s benefit, the 
employee will likely want to be compensated for the lost value.271 
Financial institutions could respond to this negative perception of 
deferred compensation by shifting a larger portion of income to salary 
and force regulators to fend off efforts to avoid the rule.272 This 
discounted value for deferred compensation could also lead financial 
institutions to shift more compensation to salary.273 If compensation 
rules are ultimately adopted, employees with the option to leave the 
financial institution must decide whether it is worth it to continue 
working at a highly regulated financial institution.274 
 
266. See Joseph E. Bachelder III, What is the Real Value of an Incentive Compensation 
Award When It Is Made?; Executive Compensation, N.Y. L. J. (online) (Sept. 22, 2016) 
(explaining the effects deferred compensation have on the present value of overall 
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270. For  a  chart  with the  discount percentage  applied  to  each  factor see  Bachelder, 
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The results from prior attempts to limit executive compensation 
suggest that strict rules on compensation do not always lead to the 
intended results.275 If the Proposed Rule follows the trend of past limits 
on compensation, the rule could lead to an increase in overall pay, or at 
least a shift towards fixed compensation.276 Federal Regulators may 
actually reach their goal of limited incentive-based compensation under 
the current rules.277 For example, if the trend towards restricting 
incentive-based compensation through risk adjustments of awards and 
monitoring performance at additional points in time, the overall goal of 
the Proposed Rule can be obtained.278 Regulators can continue to 
pressure Covered Institutions to reform compensation policies, and 
policies will likely become more restrictive over time.279 If the same or 
similar outcome is achieved under the current rules, perhaps additional 
regulation is unnecessary.280 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Despite efforts to improve compensation policies and reduce the 
incentive for excessive risk, incentive-based compensation continues to 
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present significant issues for financial institutions.281 Due to the 
continuing problems of incentive-based compensation policies in 
financial institutions, as is illustrated by the recent Wells Fargo fiasco, 
regulators are likely to become more involved in compensation policies 
of financial institutions.282 The level of involvement Federal Regulators 
choose to undertake remains uncertain.283 Regardless of the ultimate 
policy chosen by regulators, some degree of discretion will be given to 
financial institutions and regulators will focus more on detecting unsafe 
or unsound compensation policies.284 
With the election of President Trump, the outcome of the 
Proposed Rule is  even  more  uncertain.285  In  addition,  Michael 
Piwowar, a current commissioner of the SEC who is likely to take over 
as acting chairman, is not interested in passing a rule to restrict  
incentive pay.286 Of the six agencies that must adopt  rules  under  
Section 956, Piwowar was the only official to vote against the 2016 
Proposed Rule.287 Furthermore, the new administration has pledged to 
work with Congress to dismantle parts of Dodd-Frank, which could 
remove the obligation of Federal Regulators to issue new rules on 
incentive-based compensation.288 Under the current law, however, 
Federal Regulators have an obligation to adopt some version of the 
Proposed Rule.289  Since the rule must be jointly proposed, however, the 
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new leader of the SEC and potential new Director of the CFPB,290 are 
likely to push for a much weaker version than the 2016 Proposed 
Rule.291 
While the fate of the Proposed Rule is uncertain, Federal 
Regulators should continue to work with financial institutions to  
develop innovative compensation arrangements that appropriately 
manage risk and avoid unintended consequences.292 Federal Regulators 
have presented many sound policies for reducing the risk that incentive- 
based compensation arrangements pose to the financial system.293 In 
drafting new compensation rules Federal Regulators should consider the 
improvements financial institutions have made to incentive-based 
compensation arrangements.294  Regulators  should  also  provide 
flexibility to ensure that each financial institution has the ability to 
implement an individualized incentive-based compensation plan  that 
will simultaneously reduce risk and foster growth.295 
Any new rule on incentive-based compensation should focus on 
reducing the incentive for excessive risks and avoid the unintended 
consequences of overregulation.296 Federal Regulators should adopt an 
approach that correlates with the degree of risk the institution poses to 
the financial system.297 Regulators should prevent unfair competition 
among  institutions  with similar  risk  profiles  by  evaluating  the actual 
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risk the financial institution poses to the financial system rather than 
relying on asset size as a proxy for the amount of risk.298 Furthermore, 
the Federal Regulators must ensure that talented employees in positions 
that pose little risk of material loss to financial institutions  are  not 
driven from the financial industry into other industries with less- 
regulated compensation arrangements.299 If a uniform rule is ultimately 
adopted, the rule should provide regulators with an appropriate degree  
of discretion in order to avoid the unintended consequences that are 
inherent in uniform compensation rules. 
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